This paper employs a multi-country delegation model of a single monetary policy and argues that a decision making mechanism based on the median voter theorem is too restrictive for capturing important aspects of monetary policy in the European Monetary Union, particularly because intensity of preferences cannot play a role when only the median voter matters. Replacing the median voter mechanism by a less restrictive "weighted mean mechanism", it is shown that strategic delegation leads to a single monetary policy set in accordance with the preferences of the most inflation-averse member state. This finding provides theoretical support for "The Twin Sister Hypothesis" and the perception of the European Central Bank implementing the policy of the Bundesbank rather than the policy of an average union-wide central bank.
Introduction
Within a multi-country, one-period strategic delegation framework, this paper offers further theoretical support for why the European Central Bank (ECB) might be the twin sister of the Bundesbank ("the twin sister hypothesis", Debrun 2001), i.e. why the monetary policy of the ECB mimics that of the Bundesbank rather than constituting an average of the optimal monetary policies of the entire member states.
A monetary union such as the European Monetary Union (EMU) -with one monetary policy for all participating member states, ECB Council members from all member states and national differences across the landscape of which the monetary policy aims -is a case where the idea of monetary policy conducted in accordance with the preferences of a single policymaker is problematic. In particular, assuming a single policymaker fails to capture aspects of strategic delegation of each member state appointing their respective council representatives. As pointed out by Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi (1998) "the issue is not that bank presidents take or solicit direct instructions from their patrons, but whether they are cloned and then sent on their mission. When an issue of difference arises, a French appointee would vote in the style of France, and a German, as predictably, in the way of the Bundesbank."
The importance of viewing the ECB Council as a group of delegates with conflicting interests is supported by Meade and Sheets (2002) . They find that the majority of ECB Council members typically voted on monetary policy changes in a manner that can be justified by the differential between their national inflation rate and the EMU average, thus suggesting that national interests or biases -of all 18 members and not just the national central bank presidents -may play a role in deciding on the single monetary policy. 1, 2 Based on the monetary policy implemented by the Bundesbank, Germany is typically perceived as the most inflation-averse of the EMU member states as well as the most influential. With respect to legal provisions and other institutional aspects, Buiter (1999) notes that the ECB closely resembles the Bundesbank in many ways and, therefore, the ECB will implement the policy of the Bundesbank. However, Wyplosz (1997) argues that non-German member states joined the EMU for the purpose of influencing the monetary policy of the ECB, thus suggesting that the ECB will implement the policy of an average union-wide central bank.
Several papers have made contributions towards creating a better understanding of the single monetary policy and its implications, some of these papers focusing on characterizing the ECB in terms of its relative degree of inflationaversion. Debrun (2001) uses a two-country two-good model and a bargaining game to show why the ECB is minimizing a loss function biased towards German preferences, thereby supporting "the twin sister hypothesis". Aksoy, De Grauwe and Dewachter (2002) Dixit (2000b) who analyzes "lobbying" in the context of a two-country repeated game model of a monetary union, Sibert (1999) who looks at reputation and voting and Dolado, Griffiths and Padilla (1994) who analyze delegation in a twocountry model without inflation bias. In an important and early contribution, von Hagen and Süppel (1994) use a multi-country model with incomplete information to show that national interests can lead to inefficient choices.
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In a setting with eighteen potentially "nationalistic" central bankers deciding on the single monetary policy, the delegation framework seems particularly wellsuited for capturing the implications of a French delegate being French and a German delegate being German rather than both being merely Europeans. 4 Within such a framework, this paper points to the importance of how the decision making mechanism of the Council is modeled and argues that a mechanism based on the median voter theorem is overly restrictive, in particular because focusing on the median neglects the importance of the intensity of preferences. By replacing the median voter mechanism with a "weighted mean mechanism", it is shown that strategic delegation leads to the implementation of a European monetary policy set in 3 Related papers by Cukierman and Lippi (1999) and Grüner (1999) focus on the wage-setting side and trade-unions internalizing the costs of inflation while Hughes-Hallett and Weymark (2002) consider asymmetries in transmission channels as well as differences in national preferences and the implications of constrained national fiscal policies. 4 Since the seminal contribution of Rogoff (1985) , several studies have accepted delegation of monetary policy to a relatively inflation-averse agent as a solution to the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy (see Kydland and Prescott, 1977, and Calvo, 1978) .
accordance with the preferences of the most inflation-averse member state. This result supports "the twin sister hypothesis" and may help explain why Germany was willing to join the EMU despite having already achieved credible commitment of monetary policy to an inflation-averse monetary authority.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the multicountry version of the delegation model and characterizes the optimal single monetary policy from the perspective of the individual member state. Section 3 discusses the median voter theorem in the context of the ECB Council, introduces the less restrictive "weighted mean mechanism". Furthermore, the section describes the strategic delegation game, derives its unique equilibrium and analyzes the resulting single monetary policy. Section 4 concludes the paper.
The Model
The modeling framework is in the tradition of Barro and Gordon (1983) and Rogoff (1985) . Its a multi-country, one-period, delegation model in which the central bank council of the monetary union by deciding on whether to change interest rates (and by how much) sets inflation for all participating member states and, for simplicity, inflation is the same across all member states. Throughout the paper, complete information is assumed to hold, particularly in the sense that the decision-making mechanism of the council is common knowledge and voters and delegates know about own as well as other member states' loss function preferences and target values.
The model describes a monetary union with N member states. An essential feature of the model is that voters as well as delegates are "nationalistic" in the sense that they have country-specific rather than union-wide preferences, i.e. the median voter of member state j (and his delegate) is concerned with output in member state j rather than being concerned with aggregated output of the N member states. This crucial assumption is in line with von Hagen and Süppel (1994) and incorporates the findings of Meade and Sheets (2002) who show that national interests of the ECB Council are reflected in the single monetary policy.
The preferences of the median voter in country j are given by
where is output in country j, j y j y is the preferred value of output in country j, j λ is the (constant) relative weight country j places on output objectives, and π is the rate of inflation.
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Conduct of the single monetary policy for the entire union is delegated to a politically independent council. Member state j chooses a council member delegate with preferences according to
In order to conveniently facilitate the analysis of subsequent sections, it is assumed that no two countries have the exact same median voter preferences, i.e. The council sets inflation for the entire union by changing the nominal interest rate, with the interest rate change (the council's actual policy instrument) linked to inflation in accordance with
where is the change in nominal interest rates (between previous period and endof-current period).
Since the previous period's interest rate is pre-determined, the policy instrument is simply the end-of-current period interest rate. This deterministic addition to the delegation model is in itself innocuous but it has the advantage of allowing each member state's optimal inflation rate to be translated into an optimal interest change, thus it mimics the reality of the ECB Council deciding on and announcing monetary policy through interest rate changes.
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Output in country j is described by a standard Lucas-supply function
where output is assumed to be a linear function of surprise inflation, (π-E[π]), and a mean-zero country-specific stochastic shock, . As usual, the underlying assumption j u 6 In the EMU, 6 member states have more than one delegate (due to the executive board). This council board characteristic is by no means trivial and is addressed in section 3 of the paper. 7 Equation 3 relies on the same logic as the Taylor-rule (see, for example, Taylor 1993) and states that lower (higher) inflation is achieved through higher (lower) nominal interest rates. 8 Since the delegates pay attention to their own preferences when jointly deciding on which common interest rate to set, it is not necessary to specify an aggregated loss function for the council.
is that all (nominal) wage contracts are pre-determined and, therefore, that the central bank can treat expected inflation, E[π], as given.
The timing of the model is as follows. First, in each of the N member states, the median voter chooses a council member with preferences described by j θ .
Second, wages in each country are fixed simultaneously. Third, the council sets monetary policy for the union (i.e. the N delegates decide on ∆ ). i
In order to characterize the optimal central bank policy (and thus the optimal council member if that council member were to single-handed decide on monetary policy for the entire union) from the perspective of member state j, the model is solved backwards by using equations (3) and (4) in (2) and the time-consistent interest rate change becomes 9 :
and output for member state j follows as:
Plugging (6) into (1) and taking expectations, the expected loss for member state j is given by:
Derivations based on similar versions of the delegation model are shown in details elsewhere, see for example Alesina and Wacziarg (1992) for a multi-country delegation model where the central bank which shows the member state's expected loss as a function of the preferences of its delegate. Implicit differentiation of equation (7) with respect to j θ yields the following first order condition for country j:
which describes a quartic equation (fourth-order polynomial) in j θ . 10 The interpretation of equation (8) is that it characterizes the optimal council preferences from the viewpoint of the median voter in member state j. As in the standard onecountry delegation framework, equation (8) solves for the optimal "Rogoff-central banker profile" for a member state with voter-preferences characterized by j λ .
Restating the findings of Rogoff (1985) , it is straightforward to prove the existence of a unique, positive solution to equation (8), that this solution corresponds to a loss function minimum, and that the solution is such that the optimal j θ is strictly smaller than j λ , i.e. the median voter of member state j places more weight on output variation than does his optimal council member delegate.
11 Furthermore, it can be shown that the optimal j θ is strictly increasing in j λ , i.e. the less weightcontrols inflation directly and Walsh (1998), chapter 8, for a thorough exposition of the basic onecountry delegation model where changes in money supply is the policy instrument of the central bank. 10 A quartic equation is the highest-order polynomial for which the (not necessarily rational) roots can always be found formulaically (see, for example, Birkhoff and MacLane, 1996) . 11 Applying the terminology of Svensson (1997) , the most weight-conservative member state is the member state whose preferences display the strongest inflation-aversion.
conservative a member state (the higher the relative weight on output objectives in the loss function), the less weight-conservative its optimal council preferences.
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The unique solution to equation (8) maps into an optimal monetary policy choice given by the time-consistent interest rate change from equation (5). In other words, the optimal Rogoff-central banker profile for member state j translates into a corresponding optimal interest rate change. 13 From the properties of equation (8), it follows that the more weight-conservative the member state (the smaller the relative weight on output objectives in the loss function), the smaller the preferred interest rate change, ceteris paribus.
Monetary Policy in the European Monetary Union
This section characterizes the single monetary policy and its welfare implications when the decision making of the council conforms to the median voter theorem and, in contrast, when decision-making is described by an alternative "weighted mean mechanism". Under the assumption of the alternative mechanism, it is shown that the , which shows that the median voter puts more weight on output objectives than does his optimal delegate. 13 The previous period's interest rate is assumed to be sufficiently high such that for no member state will the optimal interest rate change lead to a negative end-of-current period interest rate. this particular member state was able to credibly delegate monetary policy to an independent authority.
The Median Voter Mechanism
Previous papers analyzing aspects of the single monetary policy within a N-country framework typically assume the prevailing decision-making mechanism to be based on majority voting and proceed by applying the median voter theorem. This is the approach taken by Aksoy, De Grauwe and Dewachter (2002) , Alesina and Grilli (1992) , Alesina and Wacziarg (1999) , Dixit (2000a) , Grüner (1999) and von Hagen and Süppel (1994) . . This finding replicates Alesina and Grilli (1992) and Alesina and Wacziarg (1999) , and the reader is referred to these papers for a thorough discussion of country specific costs and benefits of participating in a monetary union, including aspects regarding whether a member state would be able to credibly delegate monetary policy to a politically independent central bank in the absence of a monetary union.
Despite its convenience, the median voter theorem may not be well-suited for describing decision-making at the ECB Council. First of all, applying the median voter theorem assumes one vote for each member state which runs counter to the existence of a council consisting of an executive board as well as national central bank presidents such that, currently, six member states have two votes while 12 member states have one. Again, the findings of Meade and Sheets (2002) suggest that national interests or biases of all 18 representatives matter for the ECB Council's monetary policy decisions. Second, the "ECB Treaty" specifies that the vote cast by the ECB President is decisive in case of a tie, in which case, clearly, the President's 14 Other papers simplify the issue of council board decision-making by reducing the number of member states to two, see Debrun (2001) , Dixit (2000b) and Dolado, Griffiths and Padilla (1994) .
vote carries more weight than any of the other 17 votes. 15 Finally, and most importantly, it may seem unappealing to model the decision making in such a way that any incentive for strategic delegation is ruled out a priori -especially when the modeling framework itself relies on strategic delegation or "misrepresentation", i.e.
the notion of appointing a "Rogoff-central banker" (rather than letting the country's median voter conduct monetary policy) is, in fact, a matter of such strategic delegation.
The Weighted Mean Mechanism
In order to accommodate the suggested shortcomings of the median voter theorem in the context of the ECB Council and allow for strategic delegation within a decision making mechanism where the importance of a vote cast by member state j may carry a different weight than the vote cast by member state h (thereby also implicitly incorporating that a member state may have one or two votes), a less restrictive "weighted mean mechanism" is introduced. Specifically, the council's decision making is described by:
See article 10, chapter 3, of the statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank ("The ECB Treaty", Protocol no. 3 of the Treaty on European Union, 1992) and Gros and Thygesen (1997) for a description of the ECB statutes. As a simple illustration, let N=4 and let the council members prefer interest rate increases of 0, 25, 50 and 75 basis-points, respectively. If the central bank president prefers the status quo, and his vote is decisive, the tie will lead to a zero interest rate change. Then the council member favoring a 50 basis-points change will have an incentive for misrepresenting his preferences by voting for a 25 basis-points change in order to improve on the outcome (and achieve a 25 basis-points increase rather than a zero interest rate change Clearly, as in the one-country delegation model, the median voter in member state j is concerned with the policy outcome, whereas the preferences of his delegate is only a means to achieving this outcome. Therefore, depending on the preferences of the other delegates it may well be in the interest of member state j to choose a delegate with preferences different from its respective "Rogoff-central banker"
profile, for the purpose of "manipulating" the council's monetary policy decision towards a better policy outcome from the perspective of member state j.
Since each member state is associated with a different and unique optimal monetary policy choice, is replaced by OPT , which characterizes the optimal i ∆ j i ∆ 16 Technically, the "weighted mean mechanism" shown in equation (9) is identical to the optimal interest rate rule labeled the "consensus rule" in Aksoy et. al. (2002) . However, in this paper, the rule captures the council's decision making rather than the desired interest rate of the individual country. 17 See, for example, ECB President Wim Duisenberg in response to a question from the press regarding the decision of the ECB Governing Council leading to an interest rate increase on February 3, 2000: "First, there was no formal vote. Again, as I had hoped and as it was, it was a consensus decision. Of course, we did discuss the size and the timing of the increase. There was no discussion of the direction. But, of course, we discussed the size and the timing. Well, with regard to the timing, the outcome of the discussion -by consensus -was that it was to be today, rather than later. And, with regard to the size, the outcome of the discussion -also by consensus -was that 1/4 percentage point, i.e. 25 basis points, was by far the preferable option." policy choice from the perspective of the median voter in country j (which is, essentially, a country-specific constant and a direct mapping from the optimal "Rogoff central banker" preferences in the context of a one-country delegation model). Then equation (9) The details of the game-theoretic solution to the strategic delegation problem at hand is shown in the Appendix. In particular, the Appendix, Part 2, shows that a corner-solution with member state k choosing its delegate exists such that
where is the strategy corresponding to a zero end-of-current interest rate, and the remaining member states choosing their delegates such that
describe a set of strategies leading to a (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium. With reference to Zermelo's Theorem (see the Appendix, Part 3) this equilibrium is also unique.
18 As a consequence, any other combination of strategies would not be ex-post rational, in the sense that for any other combination of strategies there would be at least one member state who, by choosing a different delegate, could be made better off without any other member state being made worse off. Under the assumption of perfect information, each member state knows that deviating from the strategies given by equations (11) and (12) would lead to an inefficient strategy combination, thus such a combination is avoided.
The intuition underlying the described corner-solution as a unique equilibrium can be illustrated in the following numerical, 2-country example. Assume two countries, X and Y. Country X can choose any non-negative value (x) and country Y can choose any non-negative value (y). The preferences of both countries are singlepeaked such that country X prefers the sum of x and y to equal, say, 10, while country Y prefers the sum to equal, say, 15. For each country, the closer the sum to its preferred value, the higher the utility of that country, e.g. country Y prefers a sum of 14 to 13 and a sum of 16 to 17. Finally, perfect information prevails such that each country knows its own as well as the other country's preferred value. The dynamic game is then described by the two equations x + y = 10 and x + y = 15, with x,y ≥0.
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The first (second) equation implicitly defines the reaction function of country X (Y). Clearly, there is no interior solution since the sum of two values is uniquely defined and thus both equations cannot hold simultaneously. However, if X chooses 0 zero weight assigned to output stabilization). The reason is simply that the preferred interest rate change is bounded from the left, since a negative nominal interest rate can be ruled out a priori.
19 For simplicity, the strategies in this example are bounded from the left by zero, but any (positive or negative) value strictly larger than minus infinity will yield the qualitatively same equilibrium.
and Y chooses 15, neither country can improve its own -or the other country'soutcome (given the choice of the other country).
The intuition for arriving at this particular solution goes as follows: Country Y knows that country X will never pick a value higher than 10 (if country X picked a value of 10 0 , > + ε ε , X could keep improving its outcome by reducing its choice until 0 = ε , regardless of the value chosen by country Y). Therefore, Y will pick a value of at least 5. By the same logic, X will pick a value no higher than 5 and, accordingly, Y will pick a value of at least 10. If this is the case, then X must pick 0 (the value of the left hand side bound) and Y must pick 15 in order to maximize its outcome.
The policy implications of the described equilibrium are the following: The council will implement a monetary policy identical to what the " Rogoff-central banker" of the most weight conservative member state would implement in a onecountry context. As a result, monetary policy of the union will be too "tight" for the other N-1 member states. Nevertheless, such a policy can hardly be considered "extreme" as it is exactly the same policy as the most inflation-averse member state would optimally carry out in the absence of a monetary union provided this member state could credibly delegate monetary policy to an independent monetary authority.
Clearly, if all member states were able to credibly delegate their respective monetary policy to a weight-conservative central banker in the absence of a monetary union, all but one country would incur a welfare loss from the "unnecessarily" high interest rate. However, not all N member states are likely to have entered the monetary union from a position where such credible delegation was possible. If this is true, then the relevant welfare benchmark, at least for some member states, is the inflation bias policy outcome of no delegation. Therefore, depending on the dispersion of median voter preferences across the member states, the monetary policy set by "Rogoff-central banker" of the most weight-conservative member state may well be welfare improving for other member states. By the same logic, of course, any individually credible member state would incur a welfare loss from surrendering its already optimal "Rogoff-central banker" based monetary policy to a monetary union too concerned with inflation fighting relative to output stabilization.
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With Germany typically viewed as the most inflation-averse member state and Bundesbank viewed as its independent monetary authority, the characterization of the single monetary policy as described lends support to "the twin sister hypothesis" and the idea of the ECB Council implementing the policy of the Bundesbank. This contrasts the notion of the ECB setting policy in accordance with the preferences of the "median" or "average" member state.
Robustness of Findings
The main finding of the previous section -that the single monetary policy will mimic the monetary policy set by the most inflation-averse member state in the absence of a monetary union -is robust to several model specification changes.
First, it is worth noting that the result is not contingent on the loss function specification, i.e. whether an agent's output-inflation trade-off is captured by a weight on output objectives or a weight on inflation objectives and whether or not these weights sum to one. This is due to the fact that the one-country Rogoff (1985) result is immune to loss function alterations, i.e. its optimal for the median voter of a country to delegate monetary policy to a relatively more inflation-averse authority regardless of how the median voter's (as well as the delegate's) loss function is specified. Accordingly, each member state's optimal monetary policy choice (in terms of actual inflation or in terms of interest rate decision) is loss function specification insensitive since.
Second, the finding of the previous section is robust to augmenting the model to incorporate explicit inflation targets, simply because such targets would not alter the structure of the strategic delegation game. Since the interest rate has to be nonnegative, imposing a strictly binding target band has only two possible outcomes: 1)
The target pushes the left hand side lower interest rate bound to the right but leaves the optimal strategy of the most inflation-averse member state within the target band, in which case the outcome is exactly as described in the previous section; 2) the target creates a binding upper and lower bound in which case inflation-averse (inflationtolerant) member states will favor an interest rate change associated with inflation at the lower (upper) bound, such that the actual inflation rate and associated interest rate change as well as what defines inflation-averse relative to inflation-tolerant will depend on the model parameters. In sum, each member state would still choose a delegate associated with either the lowest or the highest possible end-of-current period interest rate, thus an interior equilibrium would never be reached.
Finally, it is clear that the finding of the previous section is not robust to a change in the specification of the policy instrument. For example, if the council decision making instead of focusing on interest rate changes focuses on changes in the money supply, the previous findings are reversed such that the least inflationaverse member state, in effect, gets to set the single monetary policy. The intuition is that the "natural" lower bound stemming from the necessity of non-negative interest rates, i.e. the left hand side bound that prevents the strategic delegation problem from "exploding", is replaced by a lower bound stemming from the necessity of a nonnegative money supply while, at the same time, the inflation and money supply are positively related (as opposed to inflation and interest rates that are negatively related). This insight seems to have more theoretical than practical relevance, however, since the actual policy instrument of the ECB is indeed interest rate changes and not money supply changes.
Conclusion
The paper employs a multi-country delegation model of a single monetary policy with (end-of-current period) interest rates as the actual monetary policy instrument. Rather than assuming a single policy-maker or aggregating the preferences of the council members into a union-wide loss function, each council member votes on the single monetary policy in accordance with his "nationalistic" preferences. Since the median voter theorem is indifferent to intensity of preferences, i.e. any role for strategic delegation when the member states decide on who to send to the council is ruled out a priori due to the assumption of the median voter theorem, an alternative and less restrictive "weighted mean mechanism" is imposed. Under this mechanism, preference intensity and, therefore, strategic delegation matter and it is shown that the equilibrium of the "game" is well-defined, unique and doesn't "explode". The 
